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Abstract
As late as October 1997 the IMF declared that the Korean economy was experiencing a
temporary liquidity squeeze, not a solvency problem. Yet in December 1997 Deputy
Managing Director Stanley Fischer declared that Korea suffered from a systemic
“breakdown of economic relations” so complete that only radical economic restructuring
could restore prosperity. The IMF attached what it called “extreme structural
conditionality” to its loan agreements with Korea, demanding a complete and rapid
transition from Korea’s traditional East Asian economic model to a globally integrated
neoliberal model. We subject the IMF’s assertion that the allocative efficiency of the
Korean economy had collapsed by 1997 to a number of empirical tests, including time
series and cross-section analyses of capital productivity and corporate profitability, and
firm and industry level econometric tests of the proposition that investment spending was
excessive and misallocated in the pre-crisis period. This evidence does not support the
IMF’s systemic breakdown claim. We conclude that the IMF’s imposition of “extreme
structural conditionality” on Korea is best understood as an illegitimate and antidemocratic exercise of power designed to meet the needs of the IMF’s key constituents
rather than those of the majority of Korea’s people.

I. Introduction
Prior to late 1997, Korea’s version of the state-guided East Asian economic model was
widely admired by Western economists, the IMF and the World Bank for its exceptional longterm development record. It was also condemned by Western politicians, economists, and
businessmen because it would not open itself fully to foreign industrial and financial investors
who wanted to get in on the profit opportunities created by the Korean ‘miracle.’1
The 1997 crisis and its aftermath changed the West’s view. The post-crisis conventional
wisdom asserts that the structure of Korea’s economy prior to the crisis was fatally flawed. The
East Asian model can be useful, Western economists grudgingly acknowledge, but only in the
early phase of development, when markets are too immature to guide resource allocation
efficiently and the ‘catch-up’ objectives of state industrial policy are straightforward. However,
the story continues, as Korea’s economy matured, decisions became too complex for government
bureaucrats to handle efficiently; the continued substitution of government-directed for marketguided resource allocation created severe inefficiencies that were the ultimate cause of the crisis.
As Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan put it: “planning by some East Asian countries can look very
successful for a time…but there are limits to this process as economies mature. Asian policy
makers are learning that government-directed investments, though successful for a while,
inevitably lead to overproduction of goods that neither domestic nor foreign consumers want”
(Wall Street Journal, “Greenspan Sees Asian Woes Aiding Free Markets,” April 3, 1998).2
Under pressure from foreign and domestic neoliberal enthusiasts, Korea did liberalize its
economy significantly in the decade preceding the crisis, and mainstream economists
acknowledge that this process made the dramatic rise in short-term foreign debt that triggered the
crisis possible. However, they insist that liberalization was not the fundamental cause of the
crisis; it merely exposed the underlying rot within. (See Korean Development Institute 1999,
Greenspan 1999, Brittain 1997, Hahm and Mishkin 2000, Borensztein and Lee 1999, and
Krueger and Yoo 2001.)
There is an alternative interpretation of recent events in Korea, whose adherents include
numerous heterodox scholars (Chang 1998, Singh 1999, Wade and Veneroso 1998, Crotty and
Dymski 2001, Crotty and Lee 2001) along with a few prestigious mainstream economists such as
Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist for the World Bank, and Harvard’s Dani Rodrik. These
authors argue that the major cause of the crisis was not inherent inefficiencies in the structure of
the Korean development model, but rather contingent inefficiencies created by liberalization,
especially in the 1990s. This liberalization process disastrously weakened the structural integrity
and coherence of the traditional Korean economic system. In this view, the problem in the 1990s
was not too much state intervention, but the cessation of government functions essential to
efficiency within the Korean model. In particular, absent the drastic weakening of the
government’s traditional regulation of short-term capital inflows in the 1990s, there would have
been no system-shaking financial crisis, no IMF takeover, and no radical neoliberal restructuring.
Determining which side of this debate is correct is of great importance, not only for
Korea, but also for the theory of economic development and the policy prescriptions that flow
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from it. If the ultimate cause of the Korean crisis was the inherent inefficiency of state-guided
development models in all countries that move beyond the early stages of development, then
Korea’s 35-year economic ‘miracle’ holds mostly negative lessons. Though there are as yet no
neoliberal development success stories, reliance on economic guidance by a developmental state
would apparently lead to even worse results than neoliberalism. (See Amsden 2001 and Chang
2003 for support of the hypothesis that all successful development experiences have taken place
under anti-neoliberal policies and structures.) In other words, There Is No Alternative to
neoliberalism.
Conversely, if one accepts the potential efficiency of state-guided growth, and sees its
erosion via liberalization in the 1990s as the ultimate cause of the crisis in Korea, then
neoliberalism becomes the cause of the demise of Korea’s prosperity, not the vehicle for its
rescue, and state-guided growth remains an economically viable option for less developed
countries.
We have argued elsewhere (Crotty and Lee 2001) that Korea did not face a solvency or
structural crisis in 1997. Therefore, we believe that the Korean government should have
intervened forcefully when the crisis broke out to support the growth of aggregate demand, hold
interest rates at reasonable levels, and make sure that domestic credit continued to be made
available to firms that would be viable under normal economic conditions. This was how the
government reacted to earlier external shocks of even greater severity. Most important, the
government should have postponed consideration of any economic restructuring until after the
crisis had passed. Rational restructuring is impossible in the heat of crisis. When the economy is
in a state of economic and financial collapse, there are no objective criteria for distinguishing
firms and banks that are potentially healthy from those that are not -- a deep contraction and
credit crunch will injure both well- and poorly-managed firms, especially in Korea’s high debt
model.
It was the perverse policy response to the Korean crisis put in place by the IMF, not
structural deficiencies in the Korean economy, that was the main cause of the near depression
conditions of 1998 and early 1999. The IMF raised the short term interest rate from 13% in early
December to 34% just one month later, holding it above 20% through mid 1998. In an interview
with one of the authors in February 1998, a high ranking Bank of Korea (BOK) official
acknowledged that it was the IMF who determined interest rates in Korea, not the BOK. The
IMF imposed restrictive fiscal policy as well. As aggregate demand collapsed, the IMF brought
on a credit supply crunch by closing down banks and implementing for the first time in Korea
the Basle capital adequacy standards – in the midst of deep recession! Real domestic demand fell
by 13.8% in 1998 and the rate of unemployment, which was 2.1% in October 1997 (and had
been below 3% for years) rose to 3.1% in December, 7% in June 1998 and peaked at 8.7% in
February 1999.
The thesis that Korea faced a liquidity crisis in late 1997, not a systemic failure is one
that the IMF at least implicitly acknowledged in statements made both just before the crisis and
several years after it. In its October 1997 report on Korea, the IMF stated that Korea had been hit
with a temporary liquidity squeeze only – it called attention to the “absence of deeper solvency
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concerns.” At that time, the IMF’s worst-case scenario for Korea in light of the Asian crisis was
a drop in the growth rate to 4.5% in 1998 – not the 6.8% decline it actually experienced under
IMF policies (IMF 2003a, 162-63). Yet in December 1997, just two month later, the IMF
declared that the Korean economy was in a state of profound structural dysfunction, requiring
radical emergency surgery. This was the reason it imposed what it called “extreme structural
conditionality” on Korea, along with tight monetary and fiscal policy to restore foreign investor
confidence (IMF 2003a, p. 179).
The IMF’s post-crisis evaluation report of 2003 agrees with its October 1997 view. It
says that if the IMF and World Bank had announced that they would provide Korea with as
much foreign exchange as it needed, there would not have been a financial crisis at all. On the
other hand, “A delayed or highly conditional commitment of funds would do nothing to reverse
the drive by creditors to liquidate their investments while they still could” -- but that is all the
IMF and World Bank provided (IMF 2003a, p. 193). In other words, with appropriate assistance
from the IMF and World Bank, the financial and general economic crises that took place in late
1997 and early 1998 would not have occurred. Unfortunately, “the financing packages…were
not large in relation to potential private capital flows. Moreover, not all of the money was
available – especially at the outset – to counter market pressure” (Lane 1999, p. 45). Though up
to $58 billion was pledged, by January 9, 1998, with the Korean economy and currency in freefall, the IMF had only lent Korea a total of $13.1 billion in a series of small payments, each
conditioned on agreement by the Korean government to accept additional IMF demands.
We note in passing that the post-crisis neoliberal economic regime imposed on Korea has
not been a success. GDP growth did rebound briskly in 1999 and 2000 as the trade surplus
temporarily rose to record highs and macro policy shifted from restrictive to expansionary. An
IMF-created miracle was widely proclaimed. But GDP growth fell again in 2001 to 3.1% – the
slowest growth since the early 1980s save for the collapse in 1998. 2002 saw another spurt
forward to over 6% growth, but this was largely the result of what may be the most rapid
household debt explosion ever, as the government tried to jump-start the sluggish economy by
enacting tax incentives for debt-financed consumption, and banks fled corporate lending for
temporarily more profitable consumer loans. Household debt more than doubled between 1997
and 2002. It averaged 41% of GDP in the 1994-97 period, rose to 51% in 2000, then accelerated
to reach 62% in 2001 and 74% in 2002.3 By way of comparison, household debt to GDP was
79% in the highly leveraged US in 2000. But while the ratio of household debt to the value of
household assets is only 29% in the US, it is now 48% in Korea.
When the household lending bubble burst early in 2003, consumer spending stopped
growing (it fell by 1.1% in the first nine months of 2003) and economic growth again sputtered.
The BOK predicts growth in 2003 of just 3 %. Thus, average annual real GDP growth in the
neoliberal era is less than 4%, whereas in the bad old days of 1987-97 it was 7.7%. Worse yet,
radical neoliberal restructuring is rapidly destroying the economic and political preconditions
necessary for a return to long-term prosperity. Investment as a percent of GDP fell from 38% in
1996 to 26% in 2002 – the second lowest rate since 1975, at which point it was 3.1% below the
national saving rate, an indication of substantial aggregate demand deficiency. Moreover, the
distribution of income has become much more regressive. In our view, this deterioration in
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performance is the inevitable result of the substitution of neoliberalism for Korea’s traditional
economic model.
The central question addressed in this essay is: was the Korean economy structurally
dysfunctional in late 1997, and therefore in need of the radical neoliberal restructuring demanded
by the IMF, World Bank and senior US officials? Or, did these agents use a false claim of
structural breakdown to rationalize seizure of control of Korea’s economy and the
implementation of policies that served the interests of their own constituents and not those of the
Korean people?4
The paper is organized as follows. First, after explaining how ill-conceived
liberalization starting in the late 1980s made the onset of crisis almost inevitable, we argue that
the IMF agreements with Korea in December 1997 and beyond demanded nothing short of a
complete transformation of the Korean economy. The only possible rational justification for such
radical demands is the belief that the Korean economic system had completely broken down. The
main thesis in this paper is that this belief was wrong and therefore the demand by the IMF and
the US that Korea put itself through a radical institutional transformation should have been
rejected by Korea – as it would have been if the Korean people had been allowed to vote on it.
Reform, not revolution, was the medicine appropriate to Korea’s economic problems in 1997,
and decisions about how to respond to the crisis should have made through a democratic political
process, not dictated under threat of economic chaos by external neoliberal forces in
collaboration with leaders of the large Korean conglomerates known as chaebol.
Second, we show that right up until the outbreak of crisis in late 1997, the conventional
wisdom among Western economists was that the Korean economy was exceptionally efficient
and the Korean version of the East Asian economy fundamentally sound. Post crisis
condemnations of the cronyism and corruption of the mid 1990s Korean economy are suspect to
some extent because they constitute such an obvious exercise in revisionist history
Finally, in the main body of the paper we argue that the bulk of the available empirical
evidence supports the proposition that the real-sector resource allocation process in the Korean
economy, though it did suffer a modest decline in efficiency as the result of unwise liberalization
after the late 1980s, remained essentially sound in the 1990s. It was primarily the mode of
investment finance and the instability of short-term capital flows, not the process of real-sector
resource allocation, which made the economy vulnerable to crisis.
The correct response to the crisis would have been to fix what actually had broken. The
government should have repaired the damage done by financial liberalization by reconstituting
effective capital controls and creating an appropriate system of state regulation of domestic
financial markets.5 The government could then have moved to address economic problems posed
by the excesses of the chaebol, and made the broad outlines of economic policy more responsive
to democratic processes and less responsive to chaebol and foreign political pressures. It was the
modernization and democratization of the Korean economy that was called for, not the forced
imposition of neoliberalism.
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II. The 1997 Financial Crisis and the IMF Response
The decade ending in 1997 saw a deliberate weakening of the traditional Korean model.
Three crucial structural changes took place. First, the government ended its industrial policy and
eliminated its regulation and coordination of chaebol investment decisions. Second, important
aspects of domestic financial markets were substantially liberalized. In particular, the
government permitted the creation of new non-bank financial intermediaries that were free from
government monitoring and regulation. These institutions channeled funds to the chaebol groups
that controlled them. Third, government controls over short-term capital inflows, especially
loans, were relaxed. It should be noted that while these changes were championed by external
neoliberal forces, they were also demanded by the chaebol, who wanted freedom from
government regulation and access to foreign loans that in the mid 1990s cost them only half the
domestic interest rate (Chang, Park and Yoo 1998, Weiss 1999, and Lee et. al. 2002).
It should have been obvious that the weakening of all three tools of state economic
guidance would cause serious problems that could expose the economy to potential crises. The
elimination of controls on the inflow of short-term capital took place at a time when it was in
excess supply -- repelled by the low interest rates in the West in the early 1990s and attracted by
the Asian economic ‘miracle.’ This guaranteed that bank loans and portfolio investment would
flood the area. This is what generally happens when a previously “repressed” financial system is
forced open through liberalization. With key domestic financial markets freed from government
control, these short-term foreign funds would be used to accelerate an already rapid pace of
investment in Korea, where, as we will see, incentives to invest were strong in the mid 1990s.
Since industrial policy and state coordination of investment had ended, the chaebol
conglomerates could now invest as they pleased. By 1997, any significant outflow of foreign
funds was likely to trigger a financial and currency crisis.
Contrary to popular belief, Korea’s main financial problem was not that chaebol firms
borrowed more heavily in the mid 1990s than they had previously. For all firms of the top-30
chaebol, the debt-equity ratio, which was near 5 in 1986-87, stayed well below 4 from 1993-96,
before leaping to 5.2 as the crisis broke out in 1997. Firms of the top-5 chaebol groups have a
similar time profile, but with lower absolute leverage values. The debt-equity ratio of top-5
chaebol manufacturing firms was 3.9 in 1986-87, but it dropped to 2.8 in the mid 1990s. It did
not surpass its 1980s high until 1997. This holds true for all manufacturing firms as well
(Krueger and Yoo 2001, Appendix Table 5)
In the wake of capital account liberalization, foreign debt rose dramatically in Korea.
Debt to foreign banks tripled between 1994 and 1996. By late 1997, it reached $120 billion.
Much of this debt was used to finance chaebol investment spending. Total foreign debt as a
percent of Korean GDP was not out of line with developing country experience. The problem
was that two-thirds of the foreign debt was short term, with about 20% due in the first quarter of
1998 (OECD 1998, p. 5). Korean borrowers were not concerned about their dependence on
short-term foreign loans because foreign creditors led them to believe they would automatically
roll the loans over as they came due. Foreign banks were confident that their loans were secure
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because everyone expected the Korean miracle to continue indefinitely, and the IMF was always
there to bail them out if unexpected trouble hit.
Thus, by 1996 the Korean economy had become extremely financially fragile. Korean
companies and banks could pay back their foreign loans only if the following set of conditions
were sustained indefinitely -- a healthy domestic economy, reasonable trade performance,
continued growth of earnings in local currencies, and the absence of a decline in the exchange
value of the won. In other words, liberalization had brought Korea to the point where a financial
crisis was almost inevitable. When a large drop in the rate of export growth hit Asia in 1996, it
led to key loan defaults by some highly-levered chaebol firms and thus to an increase in domestic
nonperforming bank loans in the first half of 1997.
The Asian financial crisis kicked off by the devaluation of the Thai bhat in July 1997
eventually pulled many Asian countries down, the strong as well as the weak.6 Foreign banks
rushed for the door, and portfolio investors pulled out of the region. According to the Institute for
International Finance, net private capital flows to Asia dropped from $176 billion in 1996 to $69
billion in 1997 (and again to near zero in 1998). Net commercial bank loans went from $80
billion in 1996 to minus $15 billion in 1997 (and to minus $60 billion one year later)
(International Institute of Finance 2000, p. 3). Though Korea was initially considered too strong
to be affected by the crisis that hit the weaker South East Asian economies, investors in the heat
of panic lost their ability to distinguish between strong and weak investments; they just wanted
to get out of Asia. Net foreign loans, which had been $11.6 billion in 1996, fell to minus $26.6
billion in 1997 -- and remained negative for the next three years. Total net private financial flows
into Korea fell by $38 billion between 1996 and 1997 -- almost eight percent of 1997 GDP, a
shock that would stagger any financial system, no matter how well run (Asian Development
Bank 2001, p. 21).
The first IMF agreement was signed on December 4th. By this time, the won-dollar
exchange rate had jumped from to 1249 from its value of 987 in late November. Investors
understood that the “extreme conditionality” at the heart of the agreement reflected the IMF’s
assessment that the Korean economy was irredeemably corrupt, inefficient, and in need of
radical restructuring, and they knew that IMF-imposed austerity macro policy ensured a shortterm economic collapse. The won-dollar rate thus fell to 1900 in early January – a total decline in
the value of the won of 50% from its 1996 level, a level the IMF said at the time was not
overvalued.
The corporate bond rate leapt from 14.1% in November 1997 to 24.3% in December. As
late as mid 1998, when the Korea economy was in a state of total collapse, Treasury Secretary
Rubin was still “spreading the gospel of high interest rates to troubled Asian nations that don’t
want to hear it.” His main argument was that the most important goal was to restore foreign
investor confidence through radical structural reform, but “easy money would hinder such
changes” (Wall Street Journal, “Rubin Prescribes Tight Money for Asia,” June 30, 1998).
The IMF’s long-term objective was the complete deconstruction of the traditional Korean
model. In its own explanation of its response to the Asian crisis offered in January 1999, the IMF
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emphasized that “forceful, far-reaching structural reforms are at the heart of all [our] programs,
marking an evolution in emphasis from many of the programs that the IMF has supported in the
past” (emphasis in original). The structural reforms included the need to “break the close links
between government and business” that define the East Asian model, “ensure the integration of
the national economy with international financial markets,” increase the “potential for foreign
participation in domestic financial systems,” and “remove impediments to growth such as
monopolies [i.e., the chaebol system], and trade barriers…” (IMF 1999). In other words, the
IMF argued that only radical structural reform could save the Korean economy. The IMF’s
evaluation of its performance in the Asian crisis refers to IMF demands on Korea as “extreme
structural conditionality” (IMF 2003a, p. 179)
Conservative economist Martin Feldstein, Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors under President Reagan, argued that “the International Monetary Fund seized the
troubles in the region as an opportunity to insist on fundamental structural reforms, … asserting
that they needed to remake their financial systems, tax and tariff structures, labour markets,
central banking procedures and corporate governance” Yet in fact “Korea only needed a
temporary restructuring of its foreign bank loans to give Koreans time to accumulate the reserves
needed to service the debts.” (Financial Times, “Trying to do too much”, March 5, 1998).
His answer to the question of why the IMF took advantage of Korea’s temporary
illiquidity to force the country to adopt radical structural reforms was that the IMF was a tool
used to force Korea to implement policies desired by the US and Japan.
Several features of the IMF plan are replays of the policies that Japan and the United
States have been long trying to get Korea to adopt. These include accelerating the
previously agreed upon reductions of trade barriers to specific Japanese products and
opening capital markets so that foreign investors can have majority ownership of Korean
firms, engage in hostile takeovers opposed by local management, and expand direct
participation in banking and other financial services. ...Koreans and others saw this aspect
of the plan as an abuse of IMF power to force Korea at time of weakness to accept trade
and investment policies it had previously rejected. (Foreign Affairs, “Refocusing the
IMF,” March/April 1998, p. 32)
Keep in mind that, as the Wall Street Journal noted in an editorial: “The U.S. Treasury
provides the lion’s share of hard currency to the IMF. And in return – as is well known at the
Fund, on Wall Street and in the capitals of the IMFs chief client nations – Treasury calls the
main shots at the IMF” (“Focusing the IMF Debate”, May 7, 1998). The New York Times noted
that Treasury Secretary “Rubin, Greenspan, and Lawrence Summers, the deputy Treasury
secretary, argued … that the IMF had succeeded in using its bailouts to force [Asian] nations to
open their markets and transform their economies… (“Greenspan Sees Present Crisis Moving
Asia Towards Western Capitalism”, February 13, 1998). Even the IMF acknowledges the
existence of strong outside pressure, especially from the US government. “The IMF’s major
shareholder governments made no secret of their view that IMF assistance should be
accompanied by strong reforms. The U.S. authorities in particular insisted that strong reforms
should be a condition of IMF support” (IMF 2003a, p. 185).
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Moreover, the IMF demanded that the radical neoliberal restructuring of Korea begin
immediately -- in the chaos of the crisis, at the same time that austerity macro policy was being
implemented.7
The IMF acted in a manner more appropriate for an occupying military power than an
international agency designed to assist countries in distress.8 The breadth and depth of IMF
dictates to the Korean government were referred to in the press as “unprecedented.” To
recapitulate, they included demands to: free capital markets from remaining government control
(which were still substantial); breakup the chaebol conglomerates; destroy Korea’s powerful
labor unions by implementing labor market ‘flexibility’; make the central bank independent of
democratic processes; eliminate managed trade; and remove all remaining impediments to cross
border capital flows and the takeover of Korean firms and banks by foreign enterprises. (See
Republic of Korea: Request for a Standby Arrangement, December 3, 1997, www.chosun.com.)
As Chang and Park put it: “the “reform” package, at least on paper, is far reaching and includes
everything short of the forceful disbandment and ownership transfer that the large German
industrial concerns and the Japanese zaibatsus were subject to immediately after the war” (1999,
p. 3).
Having declared that Korea had reached a terminal state of inefficiency, neoliberals
presumed that reform of the traditional Korean model was out of the question. Koreans had no
choice but to accept a process of radical neoliberal reform. In a wide ranging speech in April
1998 titled “The Ascendence of Market Capitalism,” Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan argued that
neither the “caring capitalisms” of Europe nor the state led capitalisms of East Asia could
withstand forever the assault of global neoliberalism. The Asian crisis was “an important
milestone in what evidently has been a significant and seemingly inexorable trend toward market
capitalism” of the US style. In Greenspan’s view, though area governments “relied on markets in
most respects, they also used elements of central planning in the form of credit allocation, and
those elements, in my view, turned out to be their Achilles heel.” East Asian countries “can look
very successful for a time because they started from a low technology base... but there are limits
to this process as economies mature”. “Eventually and inevitably” such a regime was bound to
fail once it opened itself to the winds of international competition. (April 18, 1998,
www.federalreserve.org).
The IMF agreements in Asia were clearly understood in the West as proof of the final
defeat of Asian-style capitalism in the long-standing war between the East Asian model and USstyle neoliberalism. The New York Times quotes Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Rubin and
Under Secretary Summers as arguing “that the IMF had succeeded in using its bailouts [in Asia]
to force nations to open their markets and transform their economies” (“Greenspan Sees Present
Crisis Moving Asia Toward West’s Capitalism,” February 13, 1998). Former US Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger commented that “If the definition of a revolution is fundamental change in
the economic and political system, …what we are trying to engineer in some of these countries is
clearly a revolution” (New York Times, “Indonesian Faceoff,” March 7, 1998). Alan Greenspan
proclaimed that one of the most fundamental effects of the Asian crisis was “a worldwide move
toward the Western form of free market capitalism instead of the competing Asian approach that
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only a few years ago looked like an attractive alternative model for nations around the
world”(New York Times, February 13, 1998). In an article that stressed his “association with the
free market political philosopher Ayn Rand,” Greenspan “predicted the Asian financial crisis…
eventually will be viewed as a milestone in the triumph of market capitalism” (Wall Street
Journal, “Greenspan Sees Asian Woes Aiding Free Markets,”April 3, 1998). This triumphalism
was summed up nicely by a Wall Street Journal headline that simply stated, “We Won”.
In the immediate aftermath of the onset of crisis the IMF defended its imposition of ‘bigbang’ radical restructuring by insisting that the Korean economic system was structurally
dysfunctional. “The past model of government-directed industrialization brought tremendous
economic progress, but also contained inherent flaws and is no longer suited to Korea as an
advanced economy in globalized markets” (IMF 1998, p. 29). In response to the question: “Is it
possible for Korea to reform the current system of industrial policy, or will it be necessary to
dismantle it?” Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer replied:
I don’t think this restructuring would be possible within the Korean model. What has
happened in Korea is a breakdown of economic relations caused by that system—the
banks were being used to funnel money from abroad into corporations that were not
being subjected to market discipline and whose financial structures were not clear. (IMF
Survey, December 15, 1997, p. 387, emphasis added)
Writing in Finance and Development, a journal of the IMF and World Bank, in 1998
John Lipsky noted that: “The catalytic role of external capital flows in triggering the crisis has
been over-estimated – in essence, treating symptoms of deeper problems as if they were the
problems themselves” (p. 10). It was “only the implementation of significant structural reforms”
that ended the crisis (p. 12). In an 1999 Finance and Development article, Bijan Aghevli declared
that “there is a consensus on the causes of the [Asian] crisis”: “domestic allocation of these
borrowed foreign resources was inefficient because of weak banking systems, poor corporate
governance, and a lack of transparency.” (p. 28) Responding to critics who argued that the IMF
should have concerned itself only with macro policies upon taking charge of the affected Asian
countries, the article retorts: “But the main source of the problems in all these countries was
structural – the weakness of the financial and corporate sectors” (p. 30). The IMF Survey of
March 6, 2000 states that “While a severe international liquidity squeeze triggered the crisis,
structural weaknesses were at the heart of Korea’s problems” (p. 78). US Under Secretary of the
Treasury Larry Summers, stated the US-IMF position nicely: this crisis “is profoundly different
because it has its roots not in improvidence, but in the economic structures. The problems that
must be fixed are much more microeconomic than macroeconomic, and involve the private
sector more and the public sector less” (Financial Times, February 20, 1998).
But if the system was in fact so corrupt and inefficient in the mid 1990s that it inevitably
caused a system-shaking crisis, we should to be able to see clear evidence of this collapse of
efficiency in the pre-crisis data. As we show below, if real-sector efficiency declined at all, its
decline was modest. The Korean economic system was not deeply and inherently flawed in the
1990s, as neoliberals claimed ex post, and therefore the Korean people did have different
alternative development paths open to them. They should have been permitted to debate the
10

merits of these alternatives without threat and coercion, and make their selection in an open
democratic process.
III. Revisionist History: Mainstream Economists Praised the Korean Model
in the Mid 1990s
The view that the achievements of the East Asia model were extraordinary and that the
powerful role and effective role played by the state was in large part responsible for these
achievements was not widely contested by mainstream economists prior to the crisis. It was the
conventional wisdom.
For example, Stanley Fischer, later to become chief economist for the IMF, wrote in 1996
that “there really has been a miracle in East Asia”; and that the view that government action was
central to this success is “widely shared” (1996, pp. 345 and 347). In the year preceding the
crisis, he argued:
First, the growth process is not about to collapse; the notion that, because this is largely
an extensive growth process, it has to end abruptly is just wrong. Second, success in
this region breeds success: there is a virtuous circle... Countries have to be vigilant to
ensure that they do not destroy the process by allowing overheating or otherwise
allowing the macro economy to get out of hand. But none of the East Asian countries
has pursued an excessively easy macroeconomic policy...so the risk of a prolonged
slowdown caused by a need for major macroeconomic adjustments is small. (1996, pp.
349-50).
That same year, William McDonough, President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank,
expressed admiration for the great economic achievements made in East Asia in the recent past,
calling performance there a “growth miracle.” He continued, “Asia’s economic future looks
brighter today than it has at any time in the post war period” (McDonough 1996, p. 3). No hint
here of deep-seated corruption and inefficiency.
Until the early 1990s, the World Bank and IMF denied that industrial and financial
allocation policies or area governments played any significant role in the creation of the East
Asian “miracle.” Rather, they emphasized the Amarket friendly” nature of government policies
and the Areluctant@ character of state interference with markets. However, this position was in
such obvious conflict with the facts that in 1993 the World Bank published The East Asian
Miracle (World Bank 1993), a study that acknowledged the importance of state economic
guidance in East Asia and admitted that many area governments implemented their
responsibilities as developmental states effectively and efficiently.
The March 1994 issue of the IMF and World Bank’s Finance and Development was
devoted to the “The Asian Miracle.” The lead article observed that “never before have “countries
expanded so fast for so long,” and applauded the “exceptional long-term growth in output,
productivity, saving, capital accumulation, and human capital as well as the decline in income
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inequality in the area” (p. 2). Governments were praised because they “adopted the principle of
shared economic growth as a major economic goal... and convinced economic elites to support
pro-growth policies [and] share the benefits of growth with the middle class and the poor” (p. 5).
State policy was considered to be responsible for creating the very high saving rates in the area,
not just by maintaining high real interest rates but by “creating secure bank-based financial
systems through strong prudential regulation, good supervision, and institutional reforms” -qualities which, after the crisis, were said to be totally absent from the affected countries’
financial markets!
The article also acknowledged the contribution made by industrial policy to the
achievement of investment efficiency, stressing the effectiveness of the government monitoring
and regulation process, especially in Korea and Japan, where governments:
created “contests” that combined competition with the benefits of cooperation among
firms... Such contests range from very simple nonmarket allocation rules, such as access
to rationed credit for exporters, to very complex coordination of private investment in the
government-business deliberation councils of Japan and Korea. The key feature of each
contest is that the government distributes rewards -- access to credit or foreign exchange - based on performance, which the government and competing firms monitor (p. 5).
The second article also lauded the efficiency of investment allocation in the area:
Investment as a percent of GDP has risen sharply in the past quarter of a century, and
estimates of rates of return are similarly favorable. ... The quality of investments
derives in part from superior growth performance that validates past investment
decisions -- a kind of virtuous circle -- but also stems from above average
implementation and the strength of institutions. ... Many of the gains in East Asia come
from total factor productivity growth, which averages three to six times the developing
country average. (p. 6)
The quality of government economic policy gets consistently high grades. The act of
developing a “national consensus concerning the direction of economic policy, beginning with
land redistribution in Korea and Taiwan and large-scale public housing investments in Hong
Kong and Singapore” is noted, as well as the general efficiency of government economic
bureaucracies.
Effective policymaking was aided by an effective bureaucracy. In most East Asian
countries, because government service confers status, governments are able to select
the most highly qualified individuals. Starting with a highly motivated and well-trained
cadre of individuals, East Asian governments by and large were able to organize
themselves efficiently, often using the concept of core economic ministries... A pioneer
among organizations was the Economic Planning Board in Korea... p. (9)
The third article focuses on the centrality and effectiveness of industrial and financial
policy in Japan and Korea. “Japan and Korea shared the way they managed and implemented
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policies. The governments had clear, credible, and flexible versions of the objectives of both
industrial policy and policy-based finance. ... The most distinguishing feature of the Japanese
and Korean experience was the high degree and effectiveness of monitoring” (p. 11).
These three articles adequately represent the assessment of the East Asian model by the
IMF and World Bank in 1994, just three years before the onset of the Asian crisis. They express
no concern about cronyism, rent seeking, limitless empire building by reckless conglomerates,
inadequate bank regulation, or bureaucratic inefficiency -- problems said only a few years later
to be endemic. On the contrary, they not only acknowledge the powerful and effective economic
role played by the state, but argue that what differentiated area countries from less successful
developing nations was precisely the superb quality of their governments’ monitoring of, and
control over, the firms they favored through industrial policy and the banks that were instruments
of the state.
Thus, a few years prior to the crisis, even the most important ideological enemies of the
East Asian model were forced to admit that there was no important inherent or even contingent
structural deficiency in the Korean version of the East Asian model.
Moreover, the IMF the World Bank continued to praise East Asian economies right
through late 1997. Furman and Stiglitz point out that “until the outbreak of the crisis, East Asian
economies were widely praised for rapid growth with equity that resulted in large reductions in
poverty and increases in longevity” (1998, p. 10). On December 11, 1997 Jeffrey Sachs observed
that “Three months ago there was not a hint of alarm [by the IMF concerning the Korean
economy], only a call for further financial sector reforms – incidentally without mentioning the
chaebol (conglomerates), or the issue of foreign ownership of banks, or banking supervision that
now figure so prominently in the IMF’s Korea programme.” He continued: “There is no
‘fundamental” reason for Asia’s financial calamity except financial panic itself”. He also
observed that in its 1997 annual report, the World Bank said that IMF “Directors welcomed
Korea’s continued impressive macroeconomic performance [and] praised the authorities for their
enviable fiscal record” (Financial Times, “IMF is a Power Unto Itself,” December 11 1997). The
IMF mission in Korea in October 1997 “concluded that Korea would avoid being seriously
affected by the crisis…” (IMF 2003a, p. 35). And foreign investors, both naive individuals and
sophisticated institutional professionals, kept pouring money into to area right into 1997.
Paul Krugman was one of the few critics who claimed to have discovered a flaw of sorts
in the Asian model before the crisis broke out. In a widely discussed paper (Krugman 1994) he
argued that East Asian growth was caused by pouring an usually high percent of GDP into
capital formation -- not through improvements in technology or total factor productivity. Thus,
growth was merely ‘extensive,’ a movement along a pre-existing production function. Stanley
Fisher rightly pointed out in response that even if Krugman was correct about this, the ability to
invest as much as 30% and more of GDP annually while remaining on the production possibility
frontier was an enormous achievement. Others made telling criticisms of the econometric
exercise on which Krugman’s conclusions were based. (See Bosworth and Collins 1996, Rodrik
1997). More important, the logical conclusion that should be drawn from Krugman’s model is
that Asia would experience a slow decline in its rapid rate of growth if it did not achieve faster
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technological progress, not that it was so inefficient that a sharp crisis like the one that took place
in 1997 was likely.
In sum, prior to 1997, mainstream conventional wisdom was that that Korea’s mid 1990s
version of the East Asian economic model was extraordinarily effective. Given this glowing
assessment, how credible is the post-crisis conventional wisdom that the mid 1990s Korean
economy was so structurally inefficient there was no sense in trying to reform it?
IV. Did the Korean Economy Collapse in the mid 1990s?:
Non-Econometric Empirical Evidence
The ex post story of the alleged collapse of the Korean economy is usually told in the
following way. In the 1990s the chaebol conglomerates went on an irrational investment spree,
borrowing and investing far more than made economic sense. They did this because they were
controlled by individual families who sought size for its own sake, rather than by efficient capital
markets. Moreover, financial liberalization gave the chaebol access for the first time to limitless
finance at low interest rates, both via newly available foreign bank loans and through domestic
financial enterprises controlled by the chaebol. Foreign banks lent money to the chaebol because
they believed they were “too big to fail”: the government would bail them out if they became
insolvent. The end result of this out-of-control economic system was a deep decline in capital
efficiency that led to a sharp drop in profitability and a qualitative and unsustainable leap in
indebtedness. When the Asian crisis hit the broken-down Korean economy in late 1997, it
collapsed like a house of cards.
In this section, we examine empirical evidence on the health of the Korean economy in
the mid 1990s. The reader should be aware that, to the best of our knowledge, there are no
available methods, models or templates we can adopt to investigate the question of whether the
Korean economic system had become structurally dysfunctional and unviable in the mid 1990s.
In 1997, Western analysts came to the conclusion that the Korean economy was dysfunctional
without delineating appropriate criteria for making such a determination. For this reason, we are
forced to follow an eclectic strategy and analyze a number of relevant data sets.
Was the Investment Boom of the 1990s Irrational Ex Ante?
We preface our empirical review by stressing an important fact. Even if capital
productivity and corporate profitability did deteriorate in response to the investment boom of the
mid 1990s, this would not by itself demonstrate that the investment decision-making process was
irrational or inefficient. Investment decisions can only be made in response to projections or
guesses about future profit prospects, and these must be based on current and past data.
The key question should be: was it obvious ex ante that the investment decisions of
Korea’s big conglomerates were irrational or grossly irresponsible? We present two arguments
that suggest the positive investment response of the period was not obviously irrational.
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First, by the early 1990s, competition in global markets had become so intense that firms
in important global industries faced the following bitter choice: continue to invest even in the
face of slim profit margins, falling industry rates of capacity utilization, and increasing leverage,
or withdraw from the industry – a move that would destroy much of the value of their physical
and organizational capital. Asset sales in periods of industry stress often bring as little as 10 to 30
percent of their original cost.
This issue is discussed in detail in Crotty (1993, 2000, 2002, 2003) and in Brenner 2002.
The rapid spread of neoliberalism around the globe caused a slowdown in the pace of global
demand growth that induced sluggish sales growth in key global manufacturing industries -- such
as autos, airplanes, computers, chemicals, semiconductors, electric appliances, steel, ship
building, and machine tools. The rate of growth of world GDP in the 1990s was by far the lowest
of any decade in the post World War II era and the period from 1989 through 1993 was
particularly sluggish. Yet supply in such industries kept growing. The high industry excess
capacity that resulted put intense competitive pressure on all firms. This problem was quite
severe for export-dependent East Asian economies. (See Kaplinsky 1998, Ernst 1998, and Erturk
2002 for details of this problem in Asia.)
Large Northern multinational corporations (MNCs) traditionally dominated these
industries, which were quite profitable when organized as corespective oligopolies in the rapid
growth environment of the post-war Golden Age. Most chose not to exit even as competitive
pressures mounted, because they had enormous investments in physical, human and
organizational capital that were firm- and industry-specific. But firms from upwardly mobile
countries have to enter such industries in order for both firms and countries to move up the
technology ladder and thereby accelerate economic development. To decide to stay out of all key
global manufacturing markets is thus to choose to remain under-developed. The result: exit is too
small, and entry too large to eliminate industry excess capacity.
If it were known in advance which firms would ultimately lose the struggle for survival,
the losers would quickly exit to cut their losses. And those who are demonstrably weaker than
their opponents often do leave. But given the importance of many of these markets, the huge
irreversible costs required to enter and thrive in them, and the equally huge assured loss upon
exit, most competitors try to ‘stay in the game’ even as competition mounts, hoping to survive
the current struggle and reap the secure, above-average profits expected to emerge when the
eventual winners re-oligopolize the industry. This is not an irrational choice.
But it takes sustained investment to remain competitive in these industries. This
phenomenon is called “coerced investment” in Crotty 1993. Price-profit pressures force firms
that have decided to ‘stay in the game’ to build plants where labor and other costs are cheapest
and market growth strongest. They invest to shed and more tightly control labor, to gain
economies of scale and scope, to develop new products and new models of old products, and to
acquire best-practice technology for both cost reduction and quality reasons. Finally, they invest
to get inside the borders of expected high growth developing markets such as China.
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Many of Korea’s chaebol were eventually able to penetrate important global industries
and move up the technology ladder in the decades after 1961, helping Korea prosper. They can
hardly be criticized as “irrational” because they tried to both build upon and protect their
accumulated human and physical capital through continued investment, even at times when
current market signals were not attractive. Giant Northern MNCs were doing precisely the same
thing at the same time. In the mid 1990s chaebol leaders did form grandiose plans to become
dominant players in the global economy, plans that had enthusiastic government support. But it
is important to keep in mind that these plans were not formulated in a vacuum and that overinvestment was not a peculiarly Korean phenomenon – consider the massive over-investment in
information and communication industries in the US in the late 1990s. The tendency toward
seemingly excessive investment in key global industries is built into the structures of global
capitalism in the slow growth neoliberal era.9
In addition, until the late 1980s, the government had limited the extent to which rival
chaebol firms could enter and compete in each other’s domestic markets and maintained
constraints on inward foreign direct investment as well as on imports. The release of these
constraints and protections added to the intensity of competition in many Korean industries (See
Chang, Park and Yoo 1998).
Second, rising investment by Korean firms in the mid 1990s was a response to very
positive market signals. Real domestic demand grew slowly in 1993, but it rose rapidly from
1994 through 1996. As shown below, operating profit rates and operating profits as a percent of
sales were more than adequate through 1995. Moreover, capacity utilization in manufacturing in
1994 and 1995 was higher than in any year in the 1980s. In addition, since the outbreak of labor
militancy in the late 1980s led to a rising labor share of income, an increase in labor-saving
investment was understandable. As a result of this investment, labor productivity growth was
very high and labor costs were under control in manufacturing in the 1990s. This can be seen in
Graph 1.
The most severe criticism of investment irrationality was leveled at those chaebol firms
engaged in competition in the key manufacturing industries mentioned above. The OECD’s 1998
report on Korea specifically condemns investment in semiconductors, steel, consumer durables,
autos and petrochemicals – mainstays of Korea post-1998 export growth (1998, pp. 23 and 26).
According to the OECD, Korean firms should have left the field of battle in these industries,
where they had spent decades developing their competitive capacities, presumably so that North
American, European and Japanese MNCs could operate in peace there.
A serious problem with the OECD’s position is that Korea’s exports were booming in the
mid 1990s. Total exports rose from $82 billion in 1993 to $125 billion in 1995, growing by 17%
in 1994 and 30% in 1995. This superb growth in exports was concentrated in precisely the heavy
industries that the OECD, looking backward in 1998, thought Korea should have exited.
The boom of the mid 1990s came to an end in Korea in large part because it was hit with
a severe negative export ‘shock’ in 1996 that set the stage for the crisis in late 1997. Export
growth in Asia fell dramatically: in volume terms, export growth in the region rose by 15% in
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1994 and 18% in 1995, but it fell to 6% in 1996. The dollar value of Korean exports, which had
grown by over 50% from 1993 to 1995, rose by a mere 4% in 1996. Heavy industry exports,
which were at the core of Korean manufacturers’ development plans, showed no growth in 1996
after averaging 35% annual growth in the previous two years.
Korean manufacturing firms naturally planned for a continuation of the ongoing export
boom and invested accordingly; thus, they were hit hard by the export shock in 1996 -- a shock
no one had predicted. The rate of growth of manufacturing sales revenue in 1996 fell by half
from its rapid 1995 pace (OECD 1998, p. 176). The export shock cut profits dramatically in
1996. In previous decades, when the economy was hit by negative export or exchange value
shocks that caused many firms to become illiquid, the state saw to it that credit remained
available at reasonable rates, and that aggregate demand growth was quickly restored to healthy
levels. Thus, widespread illiquidity did not become general insolvency, even in the Great
Recession of the early 1980s, as it did in 1998. But this time the state was unwilling or unable to
play its traditional role.
Many firms had major ongoing investment projects that it was uneconomical for them not
to complete. This is part of a general tendency in investment spending: “the rate of capital
formation displays considerable inertia” (Kopke and Brauman 2001, p. 4). “Many
investments…have long lead times and come to market even when they are no longer needed”
(Wall Street Journal, “Long a Drag on the Economy, Capacity Glut Begins to Ebb,” September
8, 2003, p. 1). But with the collapse of profitability, firms had to borrow virtually all the funds
they needed to finance investment, raising financial fragility. Foreign banks would only lend
short-term to lower their risk and the Korean government had deregulated only short, not longterm foreign borrowing. Since short-term rates on foreign loans were quite low, Korean firms
found them attractive. The stage was thus set in 1996 for the catastrophe of late 1997.
When we combine the ongoing need to invest to ‘stay in the game,’ the pressure to lower
labor costs through mechanization, positive export and domestic market signals, and the oceans
of relatively low interest loans foreign banks made available to Korea (that came with a promise
that the bank’s would roll these loans over indefinitely), the decision to raise investment in heavy
industry in 1993-96 is understandable ex ante.
However, we do not mean to suggest that investment decisions in this period were above
criticism. Even ex ante, the size and speed of the investment response to positive market signals
were excessive in some cases, reflecting the optimism – even arrogance – of chaebol leaders,
who over-reacted to the increased intensity of global competition signaled by the extended web
of recent WTO agreements.10 And there is no doubt that by the mid 1990s the large chaebol
groups had become excessively diversified, though there is disagreement as to the importance of
this problem. Most important, the heavy reliance on short-term foreign loans to finance risky
long-term investment projects made possible by the weakening of short-term capital controls was
potentially catastrophic, and this is so obvious that it should have been clear ex ante.
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Capital Productivity and Related Issues
One important aspect of the ex post neoliberal attack on the traditional Korean model was
the argument that over-investment and misallocated investment in the 1990s caused a rapid
decline in capital productivity. The output to capital ratio (OCR) was alleged to have fallen
dramatically in the 1990s to a disastrously low level as a result of economic mismanagement.
It is crucial to understand that successful East Asian development models will create a
significant decline in the OCR in their early decades. The general result of successful
development in this model is a rise in capital per worker (K/L) that is much more rapid than in
countries that develop slowly. A simple exercise with a neoclassical production function shows
that, ceteris paribus, as K/L rises, output per unit of capital (Y/K) falls. The payoff is a fast-paced
increase in labor productivity (Y/L) that makes possible rapidly rising per capita income.
The best Korean source on capital–output ratio data is provided by the Korean
Development Institute (KDI). Graph 2 shows the Y/K series for manufacturing from 1970
through 1997. From 1988 through 1997 there is a substantial decline in `Y/K, from .60 to .42.
This was undoubtedly the result of a rapid increase in the rate of investment that boosted K/L
substantially. For the economy as a whole, gross domestic investment as a percent of GDP,
which was about 30% from 1981-87, rose to 36% for the period from 1988 through 1997.
However, almost all the decline in the OCR took place before the1993-96 investment boom. (The
additional deterioration in 1997 and 1998 were caused by a slowdown followed by a collapse of
real GDP growth.) Until the export shock of 1996 and the onset of crisis that followed, Y/K
appeared to have stabilized at about .44 in response to the higher trend rate of capital
accumulation. Graph 3 presents a quadratic approximation to the Y/K series that represents its
long-term trend. It suggests that the mid-1990s were compatible with the general trend of Y/K
across three decades.
As noted above, the decline in the OCR over this period was the result of three factors
that increased the already high rate of capital accumulation. First, the sharp rise in labor
militancy that accompanied the uprising against the military dictatorship in 1987-88 caused the
wage share of value added in manufacturing to rise from 47% in 1987 to 54% in 1991-92. With
the exception of 1995, it remained over 50% until 1997 (BOK, Financial Statement Analysis for
Manufacturing Firms, various years).11 This made labor-saving investment attractive to chaebol
leaders. Second, profitable market signals in the mid 1990s stimulated a burst of investment.
Third, the end of government investment regulation unleashed a burst of pent-up chaebol
investment demand.
Graph 4 presents time series data on economy-wide OCRs for a number of countries.
The data show that all fast-developing Asian countries show a large decline in Y/K in their
decades of rapid development. Taiwan stands out because it had a relatively high level of Y/K in
the 1990s even after experiencing a substantial decline in Y/K in its early stages of development.
Given that Korea had a high rate of capital accumulation over decades that did cause a
substantial decline over time in its Y/K ratio, did it also gain the rapid increase in labor
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productivity that was one of its central goals? The rate of output per worker rose by a spectacular
average rate of 8% per year from 1961 through 1996, and the Penn World data tables show that
from 1960 to 1997, Korea had the second highest rate of growth of per capita real GDP in the
world. So the answer is obviously yes. But we are most interested in the 1990s performance.
Data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that output per hour in Korea’s
manufacturing sector rose by 10.5% per year from 1993 through 1997, faster than their 8% rate
of growth in the boom years from 1986-1991 (BLS 2001). They also show that output per work
hour grew significantly faster than real compensation per hour, suggesting that Korean
manufacturing firms avoided a wage squeeze on profits in the mid 1990s through labor-saving
investment. Both these conclusions are consistent with Korean National Statistical Office (NSO)
data for manufacturing and all-industries, as can be seen in Graphs 1 and 5.
The results of a recent study of long-run economic performance in Korea and Taiwan by
Timmer and van Ark (2000) are consistent with the picture presented here. They estimate that
capital per worker in Korean manufacturing grew at an annual rate of 1.9%, 9.2% and 11% in
1963-73, 1973-85, and 1983-96 respectively (p. 19). This led to annual increases in value-added
per work hour of 7.6%, 5.8%, and 7.9% in these periods. Results for the whole economy are
similar.
It has often been argued (see Krugman 1994) that Korea generated spectacular gains in
productivity and per capita income in the decades following the military coup in 1961 only
because it rapidly raised the rate of national saving and investment. It was not able to generate
much technical progress. Tests of this proposition rely on the measurement of total factor
productivity (TPF), a particularly treacherous endeavor. Estimates by the IMF (IMF 2001, p. 8)
show the average annual TFP growth for the Korea economy as a whole over the period 1970-99
to be 2.1%. In the investment boom of 1986-91, annual TFP growth was 3.2%, while the
investment boom of 1993-96 showed a TFP growth of 2.5%. In the heart of the mid 90s boom,
from 1994 through 1996, TFP growth was 2.9%, slightly lower than in the 1980s boom, but quite
good nonetheless. The paper concludes: “Korea’s [total factor] productivity performance has
been striking. Accumulation of physical and human capital has been rapid, but does not seem to
have been so excessive as to lead to decreasing returns…” (p. 9). A 2003 IMF study finds that
average annual Korean TFP growth is about the same as in other OECD countries (IMF 2003b,
40). It also finds that TFP growth from 1990-96 is about equal to the long-term average from
1980-2002.
Bosworth and Collins examined the question of whether the ‘miracle’ of the East Asia
economies should be attributed solely to capital deepening. For Korea, they estimate that output
per worker grew at a rate of 5.7% per year from 1960-1994, while TFP growth was 1.5%
annually over the same period. However, from 1984-94, productivity rose at a rate of 6.2% per
year, while TFP growth, at 2.1% per year, was almost twice as rapid as in the preceding decade
(1996, p. 157). Finally, Timmer and van Ark (2000) show that TFP growth in Korea in 1985-96,
at 2.3% per year, was substantially higher than in the period from 1963-85 (p. 13).12
The data on Korean capital efficiency are thus broadly consistent with our expectation of
a modest decline in economic efficiency in the 1990s as the result of inappropriate liberalization,
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but not with the ‘total-collapse’ thesis required to justify US and IMF actions in the wake of the
crisis.
Measures of Profitability in the mid 1990s Investment Boom
In an idealized neoclassical market economy, profitability is the best measure of
enterprise economic efficiency. In real world economies, profit can be raised or lowered by many
things unrelated to enterprise efficiency -- shifts in market power, changes in exchange rates,
and, most important, fluctuations in demand and excess capacity.
There are many ways to measure profitability; each suffers from significant measurement
problems. The most important question is: are profits gross or net of payments for financial
capital the best index of the economic efficiency of the firm and the economy? The correct
answer depends on whether one is primarily interested in the efficiency of real-sector resource
allocation -- the key determinant of long-term development -- or in the likelihood of a wave of
bankruptcies or a systemic financial crisis. These are distinct questions that unfortunately were
mixed together in most analyses of the causes of the Korean financial crisis.
If real-sector resource allocation becomes severely dysfunctional, questions about the
long-term viability of the economic system are appropriate, but if an otherwise effective realsector allocation process is temporarily rendered vulnerable because of a dangerous mode of
finance, then it is primarily the financial system – not the whole economy -- that needs
overhauling.
Operating profits, which are measured prior to the deduction of interest payments, are a
more appropriate indicator of the firm’s real-sector efficiency -- its effectiveness in converting
scarce resources into products valued by buyers -- than ordinary profits, which are measured net
of interest payments and other factors. The interest cost deduction used in the construction of
ordinary profits is affected by many things that have nothing to do with enterprise efficiency. To
take an obvious example, if the Central Bank intervenes to raise interest rates, ordinary profits
drop for all firms even though their basic economic efficiency is unchanged. Or consider two
otherwise identical firms, one of which is heavily leveraged and the other is debt free. The debt
free firm will have a much higher ordinary profit rate. There are many reasons why the interest
rate is not an accurate measure of the opportunity cost to the economy of the use of resources by
the firm. For example, in the ‘miracle’ years from 1970-96, there were only two years in which
the return on assets for Korean manufacturers (measured by ordinary profit plus interest as a
percent of total assets) exceeded the average loan rate
This is not to say that an ordinary profitability measure is not essential to an analysis of
the causes of the 1997 crisis. On the contrary, it is the best index of potential bankruptcy at the
micro level and potential financial crisis at the macro level. Our general position is that Korea
suffered a crisis in 1997 not because firms were economically inefficient (as measured by
operating profit), but because too many firms relied on short-term foreign credit to finance
investment, credit that was quite likely to evaporate at the first sign of serious financial trouble.
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Domestic Profit Time Series
Was there a collapse in profitability for Korean firms in the mid 1990s as a result of a
breakdown of the Korean economic system? We focus on a comparison between the investment
boom of 1986-91, a period when the Korean ‘miracle’ had not yet been questioned, and 1993-96,
when the economy is alleged to have broken down.
Since there are serious measurement problems in the construction of the capital stock
estimates needed to calculate profit rates, the first profitability indicator we examine is profit as a
percent of sales. Graph 6 shows both operating and ordinary profit as a percent of sales for
manufacturing from 1970 through 1997. The former series has a key advantage over the
operating profit rate shown below, because financial payments are excluded from the numerator
and financial assets are excluded from the denominator – it is thus directly influenced only by
real-sector variables. This profit index cycles around an average rate of 7.5% from the early
1970s through 1986. From 1986 through 1989, it declines from 7.9% to 6%, in large part because
of the rise in the wage share following the labor unrest of 1987-88. It then increases every year
from 1990 through 1995 -- at which point, at 8.3%, it matches its post-1973 peak.
Profitability declined in 1996 due to the precipitous drop in the growth of exports, but it
rose again in 1997 to over 8%-- higher than any year in the late 1970s and 1980s. It took Korean
firms a number of years to adjust to the jump in labor’s share after the late 1980s and the
slowdown in global growth in the early 1990s, but by the mid 1990s profitability was rising as
exports boomed, and had achieved levels not seen in two decades. There is no evidence of
economic breakdown here.
The ordinary profit series is unstable because the main adjustments it makes to operating
profits -- for interest charges, for gains or losses from financial assets, and for changes in the
exchange rate – are volatile. It shows a drop in profitability after 1978, a result of both the spike
in oil prices in the late 1970s and high interest rates and global recession in the early 1980s. It is
higher in 1986-88, partly due to lower interest rates and oil prices. Profitability declined
thereafter through 1992, then rose in 1993, 1994 and 1995, where, at 3.6%, it was higher than
any year in 1974-95 other than 1988. It drops in the export shock of 1996 and falls to below zero
in 1997 even though operating profit as a percent of sales rose to 8.3%. The problem here is
obviously not efficiency in the real sector, but the onset of a financial and currency crisis. Net
interest costs, at 4.9% of sales, were 0.6% higher than in 1996, and the loss from the collapsing
won leapt to 3.1% of sales from 0.4% the preceding year.
Both series indicate that profitability was rising rapidly in the mid 1990s investment
boom, and that by 1995 profitability was near a two decade high. The key difference is that the
ordinary profit series signals the county’s vulnerability to financial crisis in 1997, whereas the
operating profit series tells us only that real-sector efficiency had a temporary decline in 1996.
Together they suggest that the origin of the crisis was primarily financial, the result of
destructive liberalization.
Graph 7 shows three different estimates of the profit rate on total assets (defined as the
21

sum of real and financial assets). There are two serious problems with this index: estimates of the
capital stock are notoriously unreliable, and the denominator mixes real and financial variables in
a period of financial instability.
In the 1980s, ordinary profit plus interest payments as a percent of assets-- an
approximation of the operating profit rate -- cycles around an average value of 9.6%. It declines
from its peak of 10.5% in 1988 to a low of 7.3% in 1993. But it then rises again, hitting 9.5% in
1995, before falling to 6.4% in 1996, the year of the export shock, and to 5.4% in 1997 as losses
from the collapsing exchange rate mounted. Large chaebol firms were more profitable than
average. We know that the rate of return on assets for top 5 chaebol manufacturing firms was
higher in 1995 than in any year in the1986-91investment boom (Krueger and Yoo 2001,
Appendix 6). The time profile of the series on ordinary profits over assets is quite similar. A
rational Korean firm extrapolating the 1993-95 data from either series to create expectations
about future profitability would have been quite optimistic. (We also present a series of ordinary
profit over equity, but the main thing this series reflects is the volatility of the equity variable.)
The profit time series suggest that efficiency as measured by average profitability was
lower in the 1990s than in the preceding decade – an outcome caused primarily by the
destruction of the traditional model. But as of 1995 the decline was modest and appeared to be
evaporating. The drop-off in 1996 was largely due to the unforeseen and exogenous export
shock, and the sharp decline in ordinary profitability in 1997 to exchange rate losses and rising
interest payments. As the operating profitability series demonstrates, the crisis could not have
been caused by a collapse of real-sector efficiency.
Cross-Country Profitability Comparisons
Another way to address the question of Korea’s economic performance in the 1990s is by
comparing it with that of other countries that were not targets of US-IMF demands for radical
neoliberal restructuring.
There are some post-crisis studies that argue that Korean firms had lower profitability
and higher indebtedness than firms in most other countries, and this was the cause of the crisis.
For example, Claessens et. al. 2000 compare rates of return on assets (ROA) for a sample of
firms in Korea and many other nations. However, there are several questionable measurement
procedures in the work, especially concerning the adjustment of ROAs for inflation. Using local
currencies, they find a low ROA for Korean firms (so low they seem incompatible with Korea’s
high growth rates of GDP and productivity), but using the US dollar, they find that Korean firms
had a higher ROA than the US. In a World Bank Working Paper whose main thesis is that
“crony capitalism was at the core of the crisis,” Pomerlano 1998 finds that the pre-tax return on
capital employed in a sample of Korean firms from 1992-96 was actually higher than that
achieved in France and Germany and equal to that of Taiwan and Singapore.
Graph 8 shows operating profits as a percent of sales for Korea, Taiwan, the United
States, and Japan from 1971 through 1997. (Taiwanese data end in 1995.) On this preferred
efficiency criterion, Korea is the best performer of the group over the 26 years of the sample. If
22

we look only at the 1990s, we find that Korean firms had significantly higher profitability than
US firms every year of the decade except 1996. Korea also did better than Taiwan in five of the
six years for which data is available, and better than Japan in every year from 1990-97. Japan
clearly was struggling with economic problems in the 1990s, but the US is the world’s most
advanced economy, and Taiwan is rightly considered to have a great development record. The
fact that Korea had a better profit record than both these countries is very strong evidence indeed
that it was not structurally dysfunctional in this period. As Chang and Park put it: “Korean firms
do not have low profitability by international standards and have done as well as, or even better
than, the US firms which they are constantly asked to emulate” (Chang and Park 1999, p. 11).
Graph 9 shows ordinary profit as a percent of sales. By this criterion, firms in Taiwan
and the US, which have much lower leverage and interest rates than Korean firms, do best.
Ironically, using this index of profitability, it is the US, not Korea, that looks like a ‘miracle’
economy, even though the period after the early 1970s was, on average, one of dismal economic
performance in the US. But even with this less-preferred measure of real-sector efficiency, there
is no evidence that Korea’s relative performance versus the US and Taiwan from 1990 through
1995 was worse than it had been in previous decades.
Graph 10 shows operating profit over assets for Korea, the US and Japan. (Korea’s
operating profits are again proxied by ordinary profit plus interest payments.) The Korean profit
rate exceeds that of both countries in every year from 1982 through 1995. Graph 11 shows
ordinary profit as a percent of the value of assets for the same three countries plus Japan. As the
country with the highest leverage and highest interest rates, Korea does poorly in the
comparison. However, in the late 1980s through 1995 the gap between Korea and the others is
relatively low.
The cross-country profitability comparisons shown here are important to the general
debate about the condition of the Korean economy in the 1990s. After the onset of the crisis in
1997, most Western economists concluded that the collapse was caused by the breakdown of
Korea’s resource allocation process. Yet Korea’s overall performance in the 1980s and 1990s
was not compared with that of more neoliberal economies such as Brazil or Argentina or Mexico
or Chile, but rather with the perfect allocation process of neoliberal systems as depicted in
neoclassical theory. There is no actually existing, relatively open, free-market developing
country that can come close to matching Korea’s long-term dynamic efficiency. The Korean
people were thus dragged onto a dangerous economic development path after 1997 by the US,
the IMF, and representatives of chaebol interests, not because of solid evidence that actually
existing neoliberal countries performed better than Korea – none did! Rather, the radical
neoliberal restructuring of the economy, forced on Korea’ people by non-democratic means, was
often justified by the thesis that a fairy tale economy that exists only in neoclassical theory was
superior to the Korean model.
V. Econometric Evidence
In this section, we present econometric evidence relevant to the debate about real-sector
allocative efficiency in Korea prior to the crisis. Some caveats are in order before we begin.
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First, for key firms in the large chaebol groups that were, along with Korean workers, the
direct producers of the Korean ‘miracle,’ the main challenge over time was to create competence
in industries that did not yet exist in Korea. Rather than passively respond to indicators of static
comparative advantage, they tried to create dynamic comparative advantage (see Amsden 1989).
To do this, firms had to make major investments over long time periods during which sales and
profits in the new industry were meager -- at best. When successful, the profits came along well
after the investments were made. Investment econometrics thus cannot adequately test the
efficiency of this crucial aspect of Korean development.
Second, as noted, in some periods Korean firms were forced to engage in defensive or
‘coerced’ investment to avoid being forced out of crucial export industries that were
experiencing spells of excess capacity, price wars and low profits. Such investment will be
deemed ‘irrational’ in neoclassical interpretations of investment econometrics because it tends to
be high just when profitability signals are poor.
Third, Korea was one of the East Asian models in which banks were the dominant
mediator between savers and investors. Thus, rapidly rising investment was funded primarily by
debt and the most successful Korean firms had very high leverage. High indebtedness thus did
not demonstrate poor planning or inefficient resource allocation. And it did not cause banks to
ration credit to firms. Therefore, we should not expect indices of leverage such as debt-equity
ratios to play the same role in investment econometrics using Korean data as they do with, for
example, US data. (Moreover, the fact that Korean firms were highly levered suggests an
important lesson for the appropriate ‘sequencing’ of financial liberalization. Even those who
believed that financial liberalization was the right long-term policy for Korea should have
understood that liberalization could not be implemented effectively until after firm leverage had
been dramatically reduced. To liberalize before reducing leverage was to invite financial crisis.)
For these reasons, tests of allocative efficiency based on investment econometrics cannot
be definitive. They are simply one more source of information we can add to the data on capital
productivity and profitability already examined.
The Korean investment econometric literature
There are many recent econometric studies of micro economic performance in Korea.
(See Borensztein and Lee 1999, Joh 1999 and 2000, Lee, Ryu and Yoon 2000, Hahn 2000, Shin
and Park 1999, Chang and Choi 1988, Chang and Hong 2000, Chang 2003, and Lee et. al. 2000),
but only a few of them are based on investment performance. Most focus on alleged weaknesses
of the chaebol conglomerates rather than on a general collapse in the efficiency of resource
allocation in Korea in the mid 1990s. They argue that chaebol firms invested more than they
should have in the period preceding the crisis, and were more indebted and less profitable than
non-chaebol firms. The advantages associated with chaebol membership – access to group
finance and technical and managerial expertise as well as economies of scale and scope – were
found to be smaller in the 1990s than in previous decades.

24

These recent studies conflict with some pre-crisis analyses of the Korean. For example,
the 1996 OECD economic survey of Korea made the following observation about the efficiency
of chaebol groups:
The concentration of economic power [in chaebol groups] is criticized as leading to an
inefficient allocation of resources by these groups, which are thought to be too broadly
diversified. However, this concern is not supported empirically; the productivity of
subsidiaries of the chaebol is higher on average than that of independent firms. …The
diversification of the chaebol would not appear to be irrational. (1996, p. 116)
We do not dispute the assertion that the high indebtedness of many of the smaller chaebol
left them in a precarious financial position after the collapse in export growth in 1996 and the
drying up of foreign bank loans in late 1997, or that chaebol firms invested more than nonchaebol firms. But is important to understand that this literature pictures a gradual decline in
chaebol efficiency. It thus cannot be used to support the thesis that the resource allocation
process suddenly broke down in the mid 1990s. The theories used in the literature also fail to
provide any insight into the reasons for the thirty-five year long Korean ‘miracle.’
There is some confusion concerning the proper interpretation of investment econometric
results for Korea. One common specification shows investment/K as a function of sales/K and
cash-flow/K and its lagged value (where K is the value of the stock of capital). Here Sales/K is
the independent variable thought to reflect the ‘efficiency’ or productivity of investment – a
measure of the value of the marginal product of capital. Cash-flow/K is normally used to
measure the likelihood that the firm is finance constrained in the short run. (See Fazzari et al.
1988; Laeven 2000; Love 2001, and Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein 1991). The debt-to-capital
ratio is added as an index of the long-term financial problems. Some regressions add profit/K as
an independent variable. It is, of course, highly correlated with cash-flow/K, but profit/K is not
just an index of possible finance constraints. It is also an index of the average efficiency of
investment allocation over time.
Now, suppose that investment function regressions indicate that the coefficient on
profit/K declines and/or becomes less significant over time. Does this mean that firms are less
finance constrained, or that investment is less responsive to market efficiency signals, or both?
The first interpretation may be seen as a positive development, while the second suggests a
serious breakdown in economic efficiency. This problem will be addressed further in the
discussion of our results.
It is also unclear whether operating profits (most closely related to efficiency) or ordinary
profits (a better indicator of the likelihood of binding finance constraints) or cash-flow should be
used in the regressions. We use operating profit or its approximation as ordinary profit plus
interest payments here, but the use of ordinary profit or a traditional cash-flow index (such as
ordinary profit plus depreciation) yields qualitatively similar results.
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Industry-level investment equations in the manufacturing sector
The industry-level data used in this section are taken from a data set for the
manufacturing sector published by the BOK. We use a model similar to the one used in the
industry investment econometrics in Borenzstein and Lee 1999. We ask two related questions.
Was investment decision-making in the pre-crisis period ‘irrational’ – not strongly influenced by
the ‘fundamentals’ defined in this literature? And, was it significantly less responsive to
economic fundamentals (as proxied by variables used in the literature) than it had been in the
‘miracle’ decades of the 1970s and 1980s. We rely primarily on ordinary least squares (OLS) and
OLS with dummy variables, but we also use two fixed-effects panel-data models to check for
consistent inter-industry or inter-firm differences.
We begin in Table 1 with results for all manufacturing industries from 1972-90. (Industry
regressions use the annual rate of growth of sales rather than S/K because there is no available
data series for the industry-level capital stock.) All four regressions indicate that investment
responded significantly to the profit rate, and three of the four regressions show a significant
response to sales growth. There is no evidence of investment inefficiency in this period.
As interpreted in the literature, the significance of the profit rate implies that most
industries were finance constrained. However, we know this was not the case for the largechaebol firms that did most of the investing. The lack of significance of the debt ratio may result
from the fact that the largest and fastest growing firms relied on debt to fund most of their
investment. Thus, the negative relation normally assumed between debt and the willingness of
market-oriented banks to lend (or the desire of highly indebted firms to avoid the risk associated
with investment) is likely to be balanced by the positive relation between debt and investment
emanating from the firm’s budget constraint. In Korea’s East Asian model, rising investment was
accompanied by rising debt.
Model 1:
(Fixed asset growth)t = a + b* (profit rate)t-1 + c* (sales growth)t + d* (debt ratio)t-1 + e
Profit rate (ordinary profit plus interest payments)
Debt ratio: debt / capital
Table 2 contains results for these same regressions in the immediate pre-crisis years of
1993-97 that are at the center of the dispute about the ultimate cause of Korea’s crisis.
Investment decision making in this period appears to have been even more tightly tied to
economic ‘fundamentals’ than in previous decades. R-squares are higher and the coefficients of
profits and sales are not only reasonably consistent across regression models, they are more
statistically significant than in Table 1. The two fixed-effects regressions fail the F-test, but this
presumably indicates only that there were no significant and consistent inter-industry differences
in investment behavior.
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Table 1. Industry-Level Manufacturing Investment Regressions (1972-1990)
Dependent variable: fixed asset growth rate
Simple OLS

Intercept
Profit rate
Sales growth
Debt ratio
Adjusted-R
square
# of
observations

OLS With
year dummies

1.57
(0.74)
1.60***
(4.02)
0.21***
(4.20)
-0.03
(-0.26)
0.192

8.61
(1.43)
1.02**
(2.48)
0.13*
(1.93)
-0.04
(-0.35)
0.300

152

152

Panel: OnePanel: Twoway Fixed
way Fixed
effects
effects
1.20
9.00
(0.23)
(1.39)
2.30***
1.73***
(5.47)
(3.90)
0.19***
0.10
(3.89)
(1.54)
-0.06
-0.02
(-0.46)
(-0.17)
0.311
0.479
152

152

Note:
1) For all Tables: t-value in ( ): * implies significance at the 90% level, ** at 95% and
*** at 99%.
2) The industry classification changes slightly after 1991.
3) For all Tables: Year dummies not reported.
4) Both panel tests pass the F- test at the 95% level.
While an exercise such as this is hardly definitive, it does suggest that manufacturing
firms in the 1993-97 period were acting sensibly in their investment decisions according to
standard criteria, and that there was no deterioration in the rationality of their investment
decisions relative to preceding decades.
Table 3 covers the entire decade of the 1990s, including the sluggish early years, the fast
growth middle years, the onset of crisis, the collapse of 1998 in the wake of the IMF takeover
and the rebound of 1999-2000. The combination of such disparate sub-periods would be
expected to yield incoherent regression results, but even here we find that investment continues
to respond appropriately to independent variables. It seems likely that the efficiency of the realsector allocation process must have deteriorated to some extent in the chaotic final years of the
period, but even in this turmoil, the investment process as represented in this model appears to be
operating effectively – an indication of the underlying strength of the resource allocation system.
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Table 2. Industry-Level Manufacturing Investment Regressions (1993-1997)
Dependent variable: fixed asset growth rate
Simple OLS

Intercept
Profit rate
Sales growth
Debt ratio
Adjusted-R
square
# of
observations

OLS with year
dummies

-4.77
(-1.23)
1.62***
(3.98)
0.49***
(5.52)
0.00
(0.30)
0.319

Panel: OnePanel: Twoway Fixed
way Fixed
effects
effects
-7.50**
-6.44
-9.04
(-2.01)
(-1.11)
(-1.59)
1.72***
1.48***
1.67***
(4.29)
(2.90)
(3.05)
0.64***
0.30***
0.43***
(6.39)
(2.74)
(3.06)
0.00
0.01
0.01
(0.51)
(1.40)
(1.34)
0.403
0.462
0.532

105

105

105

105

Note: Panel regressions did not pass the F-test.
Table 3. Industry-Level Manufacturing Investment Regressions (1991-2000)
Dependent variable: fixed asset growth rate
Simple OLS

Intercept
Profit rate
Sales growth
Debt ratio
Adjusted-R
square
# of
observations

OLS with year
dummies

1.32
(0.47)
1.03***
(4.80)
0.23***
(3.87)
0.01
(1.45)
0.121

Panel: OnePanel: Twoway Fixed
way Fixed
effects
effects
-5.52*
-3.91
-7.49
(-1.82)
(-0.81)
(-1.65)
0.95***
1.22***
1.07***
(3.67)
(4.03)
(3.60)
0.33***
0.15**
0.25***
(5.10)
(2.17)
(3.05)
0.00
0.01
0.00
(0.50)
(2.11)
(0.90)
0.308
0.192
0.395

210

210

210

Note: Panel with one-way fixed effects did not pass the F-test.
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Firm-level investment in the mid 1990s
Since we only have access to firm-level data for the 1990s, we cannot do cross decade
comparisons. Table 4 analyses the investment behavior of all firms listed on the Korean stock
market from 1993-97. (The data source is National Information and Credit Evaluation, Inc.)13
This is the period in which, according to neoliberals, Korean firms became disastrously
inefficient. Yet the coefficients of both the profit rate and sales are of the correct sign and are
statistically significant at the one percent level in all four regressions. There is no evidence of
irrational investment decision-making processes here.
Model 2:
(I / K)t = a + b* (Profit/K)t-1+ c* (Sales/K)t + d* (Debt/K)t-1 + e
I: gross increase of capital stock
K: the capital stock in the end of the former period
Profit: operating profit in the former period
Sales: sales in the current period
Debt: debt in the former period
Table 4. Firm-level investment regressions for all listed firms (1993-1997).
Dependent variable: (I / K)t
Simple OLS

Intercept
Profit rate
Sales/K
Debt ratio
Adjusted-R
square
# of
observations

OLS with year
and industry
dummies

Panel: Oneway Fixed
effects

Panel: Twoway Fixed
effects

0.23***
(22.83)
0.18***
(7.12)
0.01***
(4.56)
0.02***
(-3.55)
0.038

0.32***
(10.40)
0.21***
(7.69)
0.01***
(3.31)
-0.01
(-1.34)
0.073

-0.14
(-0.84)
0.19***
(3.89)
0.08***
(9.58)
0.04***
(3.09)
0.415

-0.18
(-0.12)
0.18***
(3.59)
0.08***
(9.82)
0.04***
(3.21)
0.411

3415

3415

3415

3415

Note: Both panel tests pass F-test.
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The regressions represented in Table 5 address the issue dealt with by most econometric
studies of investment performance in Korea – the difference in investment efficiency between
chaebol and non-chaebol firms. Our results show a somewhat different investment response
pattern for firms associated with the top-30 chaebol groups. Profitability loses significance for
these firms, while sales become even more important than in Table 5. The standard interpretation
of these results should be that investment by chaebol firms was more responsive to efficiency
signals and less finance constrained than non-chaebol firms – an interpretation quite flattering to
chaebol firms. But if we consider profitability to be, at least in part, an efficiency index, we
might conclude that chaebol firms pursued market growth (as represented by S/K) with less
regard for short-term efficiency than non-chaebol firms.
The truth may contain elements of both interpretations. We know that the operating
profitability of the top-30 chaebol was rising rapidly from 1992 through 1995 and that of the
dominant top-5 chaebol was rising spectacularly in 1994 and 1995 (Krueger and Yoo 2001,
Table 6). Chaebol firms were likely to have extrapolated this trend to generate optimistic longerterm market growth expectations. If so, they probably responded by trying to maintain enough
capacity through investment spending to sustain or raise their market share in the oligopolistic
industries their key firms operate in. The unexpected export shock and profit rate fall of 1996
thus hit chaebol firms hard, leaving them with large unfinished investment projects that would be
too expensive to pull the plug on. As noted in section IV, the “necessitous” investment needed to
complete the projects probably caused total investment to fail to fall in 1997 as rapidly as the
profit rate, leading to a weak relation between the two variables. Moreover, since the export
orientation of chaebol firms is larger on average than that of non-chaebol firms, it was primarily
the bigger chaebol firms that responded to the huge upsurge in export sales in the mid 1990s by
accelerating investment at a pace even faster than the rise in the profit rate.
Table 6 shows the results of regressions for all non-chaebol firms. The coefficients on
sales are quite significant (though not as large as in Table 5), but in contrast to chaebol firms,
profitability is significant at the one percent level in three of the regressions. This difference
again creates a problem of interpretation. Given Korea’s pre-crisis financial system, it may be
that non-chaebol firms were finance constrained in a period with strong incentives to invest
while chaebol firms were not. Or it might mean that they were more responsive to short-term
efficiency signals.
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Table 5. Firm-level investment for firms in the top 30 chaebol (1993-1997)
Dependent variable: (I / K)t
Simple OLS

Intercept
Profit rate
Sales/K
Debt ratio
Adjusted-R
square
# of
observations

OLS with year Panel: OnePanel: Twoand Industry
way Fixed
way Fixed
dummies
effects
effects
0.27***
0.43***
-0.09
-0.06
(11.60)
(6.90)
(-0.65)
(-0.47)
0.16*
0.16
-0.01
-0.06
(1.84)
(1.55)
(-0.70)
(-0.49)
0.06***
0.09***
0.13***
0.13***
(4.37)
(4.84)
(3.39)
(3.58)
0.06***
-0.07
0.07
0.06
(-3.81)
(-3.17)
(1.64)
(1.36)
0.088
0.208
0.449
0.475
406

406

406

406

Note: Both panel regressions pass the F-test.
Table 6. Firm-level investment for non-chaebol firms (1993-1997)
Dependent variable: (I / K)t
Simple OLS

Intercept
Profit rate
Sales/K
Debt ratio
Adjusted-R
square
# of
observations

OLS With year
and industry
dummies

Panel: Oneway Fixed
effects

Panel: Twoway Fixed
effects

0.22***
(19.91)
0.18*
(6.90)
0.01***
(4.38)
0.02***
(-3.36)
0.039

0.27***
(7.55)
0.22***
(7.69)
0.01***
(2.74)
-0.01
(-1.02)
0.068

-0.12
(-0.74)
0.22***
(4.21)
0.07***
(8.94)
0.03
(2.41)
0.406

-0.19
(-1.13)
0.20***
(3.83)
0.08***
(9.25)
0.04***
(2.73)
0.411

3009

3009

3009

3009

Note: Both panel regressions pass the F-test.
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The econometric evidence presented here supports the following conclusions. Industry
regressions indicate that investment decision-making was certainly not less efficient or rational
by neoclassical criteria in the 1990s than it had been in the ‘miracle’ decade of the 1980s. They
also suggest that investment in the years leading up to the crisis responded appropriately to
market signals. The all-firm regressions confirm the mid 1990s efficiency conclusion of the
industry regressions. There is some evidence that in the mid 1990s investment spending by
chaebol firms was less responsive to profitability signals than that of non-chaebol firms, but this
may indicate that they chaebol firms were less finance constrained in the midst of a general
investment boom and they confronted more powerful expansionary stimuli from the export
sector in this period.14 We do not rule out the possibility that the chaebol over-reacted to some
degree to the positive investment incentives, but we see no evidence that the overall real-sector
resource allocation process was dysfunctional.
VI. Conclusions
Destructive liberalization in the 1990s made the onset of a difficult economic period in
Korea inevitable. It also created the need for significant reform of state-economy relations.
Critics of neoliberalism agree with its supporters that changes in key institutions and policies
were in order. It was the nature of these changes and their timing that was in dispute. The Korean
political system had achieved only partial democracy after the late 1980s. Control over the
political process by chaebol leaders stood in the way of genuine popular rule and, as is the case
in many countries, money bought political influence. Moreover, serious economic problems
within the chaebol system needed to be resolved. Substitution of broader stakeholder control
(with government oversight) for domination by families of the chaebol founders is one policy
that received attention and support. Sensible macro policy could have prevented the financial and
economic collapse of 1998, and in so doing would have created an environment in which
necessary alterations in Korea’s economic institutions and practices could have been
implemented over an extended period of time without unnecessary transition costs. In December
1997 Jeffrey Sachs claimed that with appropriate IMF support “Korea could probably have got
by with a modest slowdown in growth, no credit crunch, and a realistic time horizon to complete
its needed financial reforms” (Financial Times, “IMF is a power unto itself,” December 11,
1997).
Prior to the crisis, there was substantial agreement among Koreans that the traditional
model needed to be more thoroughly democratized, and most Koreans understood that the stateeconomy nexus needed to be modernized, largely in response to changes brought on by its
previous successes -- though there was no consensus about the precise form such change should
take. However, we know of no evidence that the extreme form of neoliberalism backed by the
IMF had significant popular support in the mid 1990s. Koreans elected Kim Dae Jung as
President on December 18, 1997 in large part because “of the three major candidates, Kim was
the most critical of the IMF bailout” (“Chronology of the Asian Currency Crisis,”
www.stern.nyu. edu/~nroubini/asia/AsianChronology1.html). Clearly, most Koreans favored
reform, not revolution.
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We have argued elsewhere (Crotty and Lee 2002) that the IMF knew full well that the
macro policies it imposed on Korea starting in December 1997 would lead to an economic
collapse in 1998; an examination of newspaper and business press reports at that time
demonstrate that everyone knew this. An economic collapse was the sine qua non of the US-IMF
strategy. If the neoliberal powers had tried to impose their free-market revolution under normal
conditions, when restructuring might have been most efficient because it would have been easier
to distinguish between well and poorly run firms and banks, they would have met strong political
resistance from labor, large segments of the Korean people, and even some sectors of the
business community.
This is the paradox of neoliberal revolution: efficient restructuring, whether defined
within or outside the neoliberal paradigm, requires a semblance of economic normalcy. But
neoliberal policies are so destructive to the perceived interests of the majority of the population,
particularly in the years immediately following their implementation, that they are extremely
unpopular. Who would vote for the outcomes that typically follow an IMF takeover: mass
unemployment, falling real wages, an assault on trade unions, destruction of welfare programs,
the elimination of subsidies for the poor, rising inequality, and so on? This was acknowledged by
Stanley Fischer, IMF First Deputy Managing Director, in 1998. It is the role of the IMF ‘doctors’
to administer essential but distasteful medicine to cure sick countries when their own
government lack the courage to do so, he said. “If the medicine needed to cure its economic
illness had been sweet, the country would have taken it years ago. Rather the medicine will
usually be unpleasant… when structural changes have to be made, the losses are often immediate
and the gains some way off” (Fischer 1998, p. 4). Thus, radical neoliberal restructuring cannot
be achieved through democratic processes in normal economic times.15 Only times of crisis and
chaos, when a panicked public can be led to believe that failure to accept IMF dictates would be
even more disastrous than their implementation, is it possible for neoliberalism to be victorious
in countries like Korea that have been reasonably prosperous. Sachs commented that “The
people most affected by these policies have little knowledge or input. In Korea, the IMF insisted
that all [three] presidential candidates immediately “endorse” an agreement that they had no part
in drafting or negotiating – and no time to understand” (Financial Times, “IMF is a power unto
itself,” December 11, 1997).
In October 1998, Martin Feldstein called attention to a statement by IMF Director Michel
Camdessus that “the Asian crisis was a ‘blessing in disguise’ because it gave the IMF the
leverage to force structural policy changes that the national governments would not otherwise
accept.” Camdessus’ statement, Feldstein said, “is a remarkable confession of the arrogance and
inappropriateness of the IMF policies” (Wall Street Journal, “Focus on Crisis Management,”
October 6, 1998, emphasis added). Barry Bosworth argued that the IMF “used the [Asian crisis]
to force these countries to adopt its own agenda” (1998, p. 83). Former Treasury Secretary Larry
Summers put the point this way: “Times of financial emergency are times when [outside
political] leverage is greatest. Times of financial emergency are often moments when there is the
greatest malleability with respect to structural change” (2001).
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The sequence of events leading to the IMF takeover in Korea in December 1997 followed
a well-established pattern. Pressure had been exerted on Korea for decades by G7 nations, the
IMF and World Bank, and multinational banks and corporations to try to force the country to
liberalize domestic finance and open its borders without restriction to imports, foreign direct
investment and money capital inflows. US pressure on Korea, especially to open its financial
markets, became much more aggressive after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US refused to
support Korean admission to the OECD until it got its way. The New York Times reported in
1999 that the US push “for financial liberalization was directed at Asia in particular, largely
because it was seen as a potential gold mine for American banks and brokerages.” This pressure:
is reflected in an internal three-page Treasury Dept memorandum dated June 20, 1996.
The memo lays bare the Treasury’s negotiating position, listing priority areas where the
Treasury is seeking further liberalization. These included letting foreigners buy Korean
bonds; letting Korean companies borrow abroad both short term and long term; and
letting foreigners buy Korean stocks more easily. Such steps… would make Korea more
vulnerable to precisely the kind of panicky outflow of capital that unfolded at the end of
1997. (New York Times, “How the US Wooed Asia to Let the Cash Flow In,” February
16, 1999)
When the crisis first hit, Korea’s government did not want to accept the IMF’s extreme
demands. The initial Korean response to IMF’s long list of structural changes was disbelief and
shock. The Wall Street Journal quotes IMF Director Michel Camdessus: “Their first response [to
IMF demands] was to say “You’re crazy; our system works.” The story continues: “The
Koreans, convinced by 30 years of rapid growth that they have devised a new industrial model,
were shocked by such IMF dictates.” Camdessus told the Korean Finance Minister (in the midst
of the collapse of the won in December 1997) that “unless you agree with all the items I have on
my piece of paper,… there [won’t] be a bailout.” In addition to insisting that the government
accept radical neoliberal restructuring before any funds were released to them, Camdessuss also
demanded that the three presidential candidates “endorse the IMF deal” – which they hadn’t
seen. The article notes that the IMF was not acting independently in these negotiations: “despite
their demonstration of power, many IMF officials feel overshadowed by the U.S. Treasury.”
(Wall Street Journal, “Bitter Medicine,” March 2, 1998)
External neoliberal forces had domestic allies: wealthy families and chaebol leaders also
wanted freedom from government regulation and the ability to operate without restriction in
global markets. In response to these pressures, the government made many promises to
liberalize over the decades, but it did very little actual liberalizing. However, it finally
succumbed to rising pressure in the late 1980s and 1990s.
Liberalization led to the financial crisis of 1997. This is a typical sequence: partial
liberalization in a state-guided developing economy almost always leads in time to a serious
currency and financial crisis. When this happens, the IMF and World Bank, with the support of
G7 governments, tell the local government and the public that they will lend the country the
foreign exchange it needs to survive the crisis, but only if the government agrees to all their
terms. Should the government refuse to sign the IMF agreement, ‘well-informed’ observers
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predict a total collapse of the economy. The key link is this process is the claim that the crisis
occurred because the economy was ‘broken’ or structurally dysfunctional and will self-destruct
unless the IMF is allowed to take over and put a neoliberal economy in its place. To avoid this
expected catastrophe, IMF conditionality is accepted by the government and imposed on the
public.16
Two things distinguished Korea in 1997 from other countries in the developing world
that have fallen under IMF domination. First, the series of IMF agreements imposed on Korea
were perhaps the most radical economic transformation ever attempted by the international
financial institutions – “extreme structural conditionality” in the IMF’s own words. Second,
Korea was not a stagnating ‘banana republic,’ but one of the most successful developing
countries in the world. The central argument of this paper is that the Korean economy showed
reasonable real-sector allocative efficiency in the mid 1990s: though ill-conceived liberalization
rendered the economy financially fragile, it was no more ‘broken’ than any other OECD
economy. It needed reform within the tradition of the Korean model through democratization and
modernization, not its destruction and replacement with a neoliberal model. But IMF officials,
US politicians and Western ‘experts’ insisted in December 1997 and early 1998 that the Korean
economy was completely dysfunctional. This combination of this claim with the chaos brought
on by austerity macro policy in late 1997 and early 1998 helped break popular resistance to
radical neoliberalism.
This is why the main question addressed in the paper is so important. Was the mid 1990s
version of the Korean economy so ‘broken’ that it could not be fixed through reform? If the
answer is yes, then there was a prima facie case for radical restructuring of some sort. If the
answer is no, as we have argued, then the IMF takeover of Korea should be seen as an
illegitimate anti-democratic power-play by neoliberal forces to take control of the Korean
economy and restructure it to meet their own interests rather than the needs of the majority of the
Korean people. And the proper lesson to be drawn from Korea’s experience is that developing
countries should resist pressures to liberalize their economies in ways that make them vulnerable
to banking and currency crises followed by destructive IMF agreements, and in this way
maintain control over their own economic destiny.
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GRAPH APPENDIX

Graph. 1. Real hourly wage growth vs. labor productivity growth in the manufacturing sector
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Note:
1) Based on new data release from Korea Productivity Center.
2) For regular workers, in firms with more than 10 workers.
3) Using CPI growth rate from NSO.
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Graph 2. Capital productivity in Korean manufacturing sector
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Graph 3. Actual Y/K ratio and quadratic trend
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Graph 4. Y/K ratio in countries
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Garph. 5. Real wage growth and labor productivity growth in all sectors
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Graph 6. Profit to sales ratio in the manufacturing sector.
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Graph 7. Profit relative to assets
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Graph. 8. Operating profit/sales in countries
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Graph. 9. Ordinary profit/sales in countries
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Graph. 10. Operating profit/assets in countries
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Graph. 11. Ordinary profit/assets in countries
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ENDNOTES
1

Jeffrey Sachs put it this way: “In the early 1990s, the international investors wanted a way to share in the Asian
bounty, so they pressed Thailand, South Korea and other countries to open their capital markets” (Far East Asian
Review, “Missing Pieces,” February 25, 1999).
2
One cannot help but wonder whether Greenspan’s belief that free-market economies are immune from overinvestment remains intact after the buildup of massive excess capacity that followed the investment boom of the late
1990s in the US.
3
This phenomenon of rapidly rising consumer credit has spread across East Asia. For example, consumer credit in
Thailand grew 40% from 2001-2002 (New York Times, “Has Thailand Recovered From 1997?,” July 25, 2003, p.
A12).
4
We refer to the IMF agreements with Korea as a “takeover” for two reasons. First, the Korean people were given
no opportunity to accept or reject them. If they had been given such an opportunity, rejection was near certain.
Second, the candidates for the presidency in the election of December 1997 were under extreme pressure from the
US to agree to the IMF’s demands unconditionally.
5
See Crotty and Lee 2001 for a proposal for economic reform in post-crisis Korea.
6
Only countries such as China, Taiwan and India, that maintained effective control of their capital accounts,
remained relatively unscathed.
7
See Crotty and Lee 2002 for a discussion of the politics of radical restructuring.
8
See Crotty and Lee 2001 for a detailed discussion of the radical restructuring done under IMF guidance and its
negative impact on Korea’s economy.
9
A number of analysts consider the East Asian crisis to be but one manifestation of an emerging crisis in the global
neoliberal economic system. See Brenner 2002 and Crotty 2000 and 2003.
10
In an interview with one of the authors in March 1998, a leading spokesman for chaebol interests acknowledged
that their investment response to the positive signals of 1993-95 was excessive and reflected a kind of triumphalist
optimism in the wake of their successful efforts to free themselves of many government controls.
11
The dramatic rise in the rate of unemployment and the attacks on labor demanded by the IMF and supported by
President Kim after December 1997 led to a collapse in the wage share of value-added to less than 42% in 1999.
12
Empirical studies by Nehru and Dhareshwar (1994), Sarel (1997) and Nadiri and Son (1997) also support the
thesis that TPG growth was adequate in the 1990s in Korea.
13
Outliers are excluded from the regressions.
14
Regressions that include cash flow or cash in stock (the short-term liquid assets of the firm) yield qualitative
results similar to the regressions shown here.
15
The imposition of radical neoliberal restructuring is likely to meet less popular resistance in countries that have
suffered from a long period of economic stagnation.
16
In the case of Korea, the US and IMF had a willing ally in President-elect Kim Dae Jung. The peculiar role played
by Kim is described in Crotty and Lee 2002.
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